FREEDOM OF INFORMATION-DIscLosuRE-ExEMPTION Two OF

FOIA

PROTECTS LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUALS FROM DISCLOSURE-

Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),' enacted by Congress
2
in 1966, embodies "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure."
Unless the information sought by an individual is clearly protected
from disclosure by the statutory language, 3 it must be made available
either by publication or request. 4 To insure government effectiveness
certain material is protected from disclosure by exemptions contained
within the statute. In EPA v. Mink, 5 the Supreme Court ruled that the
nine exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 6 were limited and exclusive.7
One of these exemptions, section 552(b) (2) (exemption two), pertaining to internal personnel rules and agency practices, has been the
source of much litigation in the context of disclosure of law enforcement manuals. 8
Pursuant to the FOIA, Michael Crooker filed a request with the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) in mid 1978."
Crooker sought a copy of the training manual for BATF agents entitled "Surveillance of Premises, Vehicles and Persons-New Agent
Training."' Initially, the BATF denied the request entirely;" however, after an administrative appeal the Director of BATF released the
material except for one section of the manual. ' 2 The Director withheld this portion based on exemptions contained in the FOIA, specifically section 552(a)(2) (C), which requires the publication of adminis-

1 5 U.S.C.
2

S.

REP.

§ 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965), reprintedin 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 2418 [hereinafter cited as

SENATE REPoRT].

3Id.
4 Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
3 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
7 410 U.S. at 79-80.
8 Exemption two states: "(b) This section does not apply to matters that are- . . (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)
(1976).
9 Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir.

1981).
10

Id.

I I d.
12 Id. This portion detailed "methods and procedures for conducting surveillance of criminal
suspects and contain[ed] extensive information concerning methods, strategies, techniques and
guidelines to be employed by ATF special agents in performance of their duties." Id. at 1054 n.5.
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trative staff manuals, and exemption two. 1 3 The BATF claimed that
release of this portion would allow individuals to circumvent the law
by obtaining information on agents' methods of surveillance of sus14
pects.
Dissatisfied with this result, Crooker filed a pro se complaint in

the district court to compel the BATF to release the withheld portion. 15 Thereafter, he moved for summary judgment but failed to
support the motion with affidavits or other documents.'
The gov-

ernment also filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively for summary
judgment supported by the Director's affidavit and copies of the

withheld portions.' 7 In return, Crooker submitted a reply memorandum and renewed his claim for summary judgment. 8 In the reply
memoradum Crooker asserted that the manual directly affects the
public at large "[because it involves] surveillance of members of the
public by federal authorities;"' 9 however, he did not contest the
government's claim that release of the entire manual would result in
20
circumvention of the law.
Upon examining the BATF manual in camera, the district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment based on
exemption two,2 1 citing the D.C. circuit court's decision in Cox v.
United States Department of Justice.2 2 On appeal, a three judge
panel of the D.C. circuit court ruled that under the rationale of

Jordan v. United States Department of Justice,2 3 which held exemption two to be inapplicable to law enforcement manuals, the unreleased portions of the manual were not protected from disclosure by

13 Id. at 1053-54. Section (a)(2)(C) states: "(a) Each agency shall make available to the
public information as follows: (2) Each agency in accordance with published rules, shall make
available for public inspection and copying. . . (C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1976). Although the
BATF claim relied on both exemptions the only issue under consideration in Crooker was
whether the material qualified under exemption two. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1054 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
", Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(citing Affidavit of G.R. Dickerson at 10).
Is Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is Id.

1' Id. (quoting Reply Memorandum at 12).
10 Id. As a result of Crooker's failure to contest the government's claim, the court must take
the government's assertions as true for purposes of summary judgment under FED. R. CIv. P.
56(e). Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
21 Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
11 601 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
23 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(en bane).
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exemption two.2 4 A majority of the full court voted to vacate the panel
decision and to rehear the case en banc.2 5 In a nine to one decision
the majority upheld the government's claim that the undisclosed portion of the BATF manual was properly withheld under exemption
two.2 1 Writing for the majority, Judge Edwards developed a new test
to determine whether requested information falls within the category
of internal personnel rules of exemption two.2 7 According to the holding of Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,28 if a
document is "predominantly internal" and disclosure would significantly risk circumvention of the law, exemption two protects the
29
material from disclosure.
The controversy over exemption two stems from the conflicting
language in the legislative reports.3 0 The Senate Report limited the
scope of exemption two to relations between the agency and its employees. 31 In direct contrast, the House Report stated that exemption
two "would not cover all 'matters of internal management' such as
employee relations," but would protect "[o]perating rules, guidelines
and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners."'3 2 As a result of this description, courts considering exemption
two cases must first resolve the question of which report more accurately reflects congressional intent.3 3 The overall majority of courts
have adhered to the Senate interpretation.3 4
Prior to the court's opinion in Crooker, the D.C. Circuit had
adopted the Senate Report's version as well. The first major decision
within the D.C. Circuit to address the exemption two issue was
Vaughn v. Rosen. 35 The plaintiff in Vaughn sought the release of
certain Civil Service Commission reports on personnel manage2

Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1055 (D.C. Cir.

1981).
23 Id.

16Id. at 1053.
27 Id.

- 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29 Id. at 1074.

30See Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A CriticalReview, 38 CEo. WASH. L. REv.
150, 154 (1969); Comment, The Status of Law Enforcement Manuals Under the Freedom of
InformationAct, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 734, 748 (1980).
31 Specifically, the Senate Report states: "Exemption No. 2 relates only to internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of parking
facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like." SENATE
REplorr, supra note 2, at 8.
32H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1965), reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2427 [hereinafter cited as HousE REvoi-r].
3Project,

Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73

MIcH.

L. REv. 971, 1052

(1975).
34 Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 363-64 & n.5 (1976).
"523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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ment. 36 In upholding the district court decision, 37 the majority opinion, written by Judge Wilkey, specifically rejected the House Report's
interpretation of exemption two in favor of the Senate's interpretation. 38 First, the majority claimed that the legislative history of the
Act indicated the broad congressional policy of disclosure and the
more specific language of the Senate Report was more consistent with
this goal.39 Second, because the Senate passed the bill before the
House Committee Report was issued-the Senate Report was the only
40
report before both Houses when the final vote was taken on the bill.

Relying on the Senate Report, the majority in Vaughn drew a distinction between "minor or trivial matters" which are exempt and "those
more substantial matters which might 41be the subject of legitimate
public interest," which are not exempt.
In a concurring opinion Judge Leventhal agreed with the majority that the personnel reports should be released, but his analysis of the
legislative history and scope of exemption two differed completely.
First, Judge Leventhal argued that the Senate Report was available to
both Houses only theoretically.42 In addition, Judge Leventhal
claimed that even if the Senate Report indicated the overall need for
43
disclosure, it did not specifically explain any particular provision.
After concluding that the Senate Report was not really indicative of
congressional intent in this instance, Judge Leventhal analyzed the
Id. at 1139.
37 Although the district court did protect some material relating to individual employers and
agency officials, this issue was not before the court of appeals. Only those portions ruled not to be
protected by exemptions two and five were considered by the court on appeal. Id.
3$ Id. at 1142-43. The Senate Report was considered more authoritative because it was the
only report available to the members of both Houses. Id. at 1142. Furthermore, in favoring more
disclosure than the House Report, the Senate Report was deemed to be more in accord with the
FOIA. Id.
3 id.
'

40 Id.

11 Id. at 1142.
11 Id. at 1148 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Judge Leventhal stated:
The members of the House committee did have the Senate Report, but they departed
from it. If one is to give preference to date of preparation as a crucial factor, one
might just as well, or better, say that the second group had more opportunity to
ponder and reflect. As to the mass of members of the House, the realities of the
legislative process advise that what they had furnished to them for floor consideration is the bill (here there were no differences from the Senate bill) and the House
Report. They could theoretically send for the Senate Report, but what occasion
would there be for such a rare step unless they were particularly interested in the bill
(though not a member of the Committee) or were alerted by constituents? Again as a
matter of the legislative reality of the legislative process, each House regardsits own
position as distinctive, and its members rarely if ever refer to reports of the other
chamber. House and Senate reports often are catbon copies of each other.
Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id.
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language of exemption two itself which exempts "matters that are...
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency. '" 44 Judge Leventhal viewed the use of the word "solely" as

being too restrictive. 45 Rather, he substituted the word "predomi4
nantly" as a more reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. 6
practices
Thus, if material were related predominantly to the 4internal
7
disclosure.
from
protected
be
would
of an agency it
In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,4 8 the Supreme Court
relied on the majority opinion in Vaughn to release information on
proceedings under the Air Force Academy Honor Code.49 While
explaining the Court's preference for the Senate Report's interpretation of exemption two, Justice Brennan incorporated the majority's
rationale in Vaughn. 50 Summarizing the Court's position on exemption two, Justice Brennan wrote that "the general thrust of the exemption is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and
maintaining for public inspection matters in which the public could
not reasonably be expected to have an interest." 51 The interest of the
public in the material sought was the qualifying factor in the Rose
decision. Thus, if the public has no legitimate interest or no legitimate
need to know of certain agency material, it need not be disclosed. The
Court in Rose drew this distinction along the guidelines used by Judge
Wilkey in Vaughn-substantial matters require disclosure and trivial
matters do not.52 Because the material in Rose was not law enforcement guidelines it was not exempt,53 however, the Court was careful
to limit its holding to situations where disclosure would not risk
circumvention of agency regulations.M
The Supreme Court's failure in Rose to resolve whether exemption two will protect law enforcement manuals when circumvention is
44 For the text of exemption two, see supra note 8.
1s 523 F.2d at 1150-51 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 1151 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
4 Id. This standard of "predominantly internal" was adopted by the majority in Crooker.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
40 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
41 Id. at 355.
50 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
51 425 U.S. at 369-70.
52

Id. at 365.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
54 Specifically, the Court held: "For the reasons stated by Judge Wilkey, and because we
think the primaryfocus of the House Report was an exemption of disclosures that might enable
the regulated to circumvent agency regulation, we too 'choose to rely upon the Senate Report' in
53

this regard." 425 U.S. at 366-67 (emphasis added). The majority in Crookerspecifically relied on
this factor and based part of its ruling on the implication that if circumvention is a possibility,
the House Report may be relied on. 670 F.2d at 1066.
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a possibility, has led other courts to deal with this issue in a variety of
ways. Basically, there have been two statutory alternatives available
in cases such as this: an exemption for law enforcement manuals

based on section 552(a)(2)(C) which pertains only to administrative
staff manuals; 55 and protection under exemption two which allows
the exemption of internal personnel rules.-6
The basic thrust of decisions granting protection from disclosure
under section 552(a)(2)(C) is that this provision contains an "implicit

exemption. ' 57 A reading of the legislative history of this section
shows that the word "administrative" was not contained in the original bill before the Senate.58 This word was added when the Senate
Judiciary Committee expressed concern over the scope of this provision. 59 The report of this Committee indicated that only administrative manuals, not law enforcement manuals, were intended to be
disclosed under section 552(a)(2)(C).60 The major problem with using section 552(a)(2)(C) as a protection device is the language contained in section 552(a)(3), the "catch-all" provision which provides
that any request for information that "(A) reasonably describes such
records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules . . . "
must be complied with by the agency. 6' Therefore, courts that have

"

For the text of section 552(a)(2)(C), see supra note 13.

A few circuits have not yet decided the exemption two issue. E.g. Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d
1213 (3d Cir. 1981); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1005 (4th Cir. 1978); Maroscia v. Levi,
569 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977).
" The first case to announce this doctrine of implicit exemption was Hawkes v. IRS, 467
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974) (exempting IRS tax manuals).
Other courts have followed the Sixth Circuit and relied on this exemption. E.g., Cox v. Levi
(Cox 1l), 592 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1979) (exempting FBI manual of rules and regulations); Cox v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1978) (exempting drug enforcement manual); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968); cf. Kuehnert v. FBI, 629
F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980) (court expressed doubt that FBI materials or investigative leads fell
under exemption two). But see Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973) (OSHA manuals
not exempt); cf. Sladek v. Bensinger, 605 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1979) (court declined to rule on
whether exemption two applies when there is possible circumvention of law if disclosure is
permitted).
" See SENATE REoirr, supra note 2.
0 Id.
0 See Comment, supra note 30, at 738.
'1 Section 552(a)(3) reads:
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably
describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the
time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records
promptly available to any person.
Id.
One commentator has suggested that these two sections may be reconciled by regarding
section 552(a)(2) as a public disclosure provision and section 552(a)(3) as an individual disclosure
provision wherein a request must be made for the material specifically. Comment, supra note
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relied on section 552(a)(2)(C) have been forced to find an "implicit
exemption" in the section's language by claiming that the language of
the House and Senate Reports "predominate over the literal meaning

of the statute in order to avoid a result that Congress clearly did not
62
intend."
Those courts finding that exemption two protects personnel rules
have been forced to rely upon the House Report's broader interpretation of the scope of the exemption, rather than the more restrictive

Senate version.6 3 Early court decisions did not discuss their rationale
for relying on exemption two, but merely stated that the manuals
were protected, thereby presumably relying on the House Report
since this information was clearly exempted by its language.64 It was
only after the decision in Rose that the Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits relied explicitly on the House Report to
allow protection of law enforcement manuals under exemption two. 5
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed
neither of these alternatives. In Jordan,66 Judge Wilkey, writing for
30, at 746. Hence, if information is exempted by section 552(a)(2), the request can still be made
under section 552(a)(3). Since to obtain information under section 552(a)(3) a court order will
probably be necessary, disclosure would still be more limited.
12 Comment, supra note 30, at 738-39; see also United States v. Imbrunone, 379 F. Supp.
256 (E.D. Mich. 1974), where the court relied on Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974), in holding that the IRS audit manual used to detect
noncompliance with tax laws was exempt from disclosure under sections 552(a)(2)(C). 379 F.
Supp. at 260.
Another decision adhering to this doctrine is City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958
(N.D. Cal. 1971). As one commentator observed, the logic of the court's reasoning in Ambrose is
somewhat suspect since the court concluded that sections 552(a)(2) and 552(a)(3) are mutually
exclusive. There is no support for this proposition in the statute or legislative history. Comment,
supra note 30 at 744 n.64.
Interestingly enough, the court in Ambrose indicated in dictum that the House Report could
be relied on where circumvention of the law is a possibility.
6'3See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
' Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp.
504 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other groundssub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Justice Brennan in Rose referred to these cases as examples of reliance on the House
Report in situations where circumvention of the law had been at risk. He also indicated that "'this
was the primary concern of the committee drafting the House Report." 425 U.S. at 364.
65 In Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1978), the
court concluded that the decision in Rose which implicitly relied on the House Report where
circumvention of the law was a possibility, "not only does not preclude but furnishes support for
holding that this exemption prevents the forced disclosure of the information in the BATF
manual which is here sought." Id. at 547; see also Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 999, 100506 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980), followed the
Caplan rationale by relying on the implication contained in Rose. See supra note 54.
"
The case of Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir.), vacated and aff'd by an evenly divided court, 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en
banc), was decided at the same time as Jordan. In the panel opinion by Judge MacKinnon,
certain FEA material was exempted from disclosure based on his grammatical dissection of the
language of exemption two. 591 F.2d at 723.
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the majority, held that the United States Attorney's prosecutorial
guidelines were not exempt from disclosure since "Exemption two was

not designed to protect documents whose disclosure might risk circumvention of agency regulations."6 7 The court, in an en banc decision, adopted the rationale of Vaughn, namely, that only trivial per-

sonnel matters were exempt from disclosure, and gave full support to
the Senate interpretation of the scope of exemption two. 68
In his concurrence, Judge Leventhal reiterated his "predominantly internal" standard, discussed in Vaughn,69 and pursued this
rationale even further. He argued that where documents consist of
"internal instructions" risking circumvention of the law, "and there is

no substantial, valid external interest of the community at large in
revelation," exemption two will prevent disclosure. 70 This concern
over public interest had been expressed by the Supreme Court in Rose.
Judge Bazelon also concurred in Jordan'sresult, but chose to rely
7
on what he termed "secret law" aspects of the undisclosed material. '
Arguing that one of the principal purposes of the FOIA was to prevent
the withholding of "secret law" which affects the public but is generally unknown to them, Judge Bazelon concluded that these prosecuto72
rial guidelines were in fact "secret law" and should be released.
With Jordanbeing the only en banc decision, the rule in the D.C.
Circuit was that exemption two was not applicable to law enforcement manuals. Yet, continuing disagreement among the judges was
7
reflected in subsequent cases. .
67 591 F.2d at 771. Relying on the decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the court
explicitly rejected the use of section 552(a)(2)(C) as a means of exemption since it is not contained
within the enumerated list of section 552(b).
The court also rejected the government's claim that the decision in Rose implied the
Supreme Court's endorsement of exemption two as protecting law enforcement manuals. Judge
Wilkey observed that all this language meant was that the Supreme Court had cautiously left
open the question of what to do about any exemption "where disclosure may risk circumvention
of agency regulation." 591 F.2d at 771.
11 591 F.2d at 768-71.
61 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
70 591 F.2d at 783 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 781 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
12 Id.

73 See. e.g., Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Cox was a
panel opinion by Judge MacKinnon that exempted a U.S. Marshall's Manual from disclosure
under exemption two. The decision attempted to distinguish Jordan on the ground of "secret
law." However, the secret law argument was contained only in Judge Bazelon's concurring
opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 71 & 72.
Two other cases followed Jordan as well. Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Although Lesar
allowed the use of exemption two, to some extent this case is distinguishable from Jordanon its
facts. Allen did follow the guidelines established by Jordan but also mentioned that the material
involved would probably not be exempt even under the House Report's interpretation. 636 F.2d
at 1290 n.20.
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The arguments presented by the majority, the concurrence, and
the dissent in Crooker encompass a variety of concerns. The structure
of the court's rationale was broken down into four major topics: first,
an analysis of the language of exemption two; second, a consideration
of the history of the Act and its passage through Congress; third, an
overview of other provisions of the Act which may lend insight into
the congressional intent behind exemption two; and finally, a review
of prior case law dealing with this issue.
THE LANGUAGE OF ExEPTIrON

Two

In the majority opinion, Judge Edwards noted the general philosophy of full disclosure that the Act was conceived to embody. 74 He
characterized the nine exemptions in section (b) as providing the only
means of shielding material from disclosure. 5 The court then stated
that the language of exemption two, on its face, provided protection
for the BATF manual.76 To support this statement the court had to
reject its ruling in Jordan that the phrase "personnel rules and practices" contained in exemption two referred only to trivial matters such
as pensions, vacations and salaries. 7" Instead, the majority chose to
accept the interpretation of this phrase formulated by the Second and
Ninth Circuits in Caplanv. BA TF and Hardy v. BA TF respectively,78
which relied on the broader interpretation of exemption two contained in the House Report. In accordance with its acceptance of the
House Report's analysis of exemption two, the Crooker court adopted
Judge Leventhal's interpretation of the phrase "related solely to" to
mean "predominantly" as outlined in his concurring opinion in
Vaughn.7
Judge Wilkey's dissent in Crooker directly challenged the majority's assertion that exemption two on its face prevented disclosure of
the BATF manual. He claimed that the majority ignored the language

71 670 F.2d at 1055. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
7S 670 F.2d at 1055 & n.11; accord EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
75 670 F.2d at 1056.
77Id.
78 Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. However, the majority did not explain its
reason for accepting the Second and Ninth Circuits' interpretation.
79 670 F.2d at 1056. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47 where Judge Leventhal
defined "solely" as the equivalent of predominantly. The court rejected the literal meaning of

these terms because it would limit exemption two to matters which are of no legitimate interest
to the public. Despite the fact that this is the same test devised and applied by the Supreme Court
in Rose, see supra text accompanying notes 51 & 52, Judge Edwards' opinion recanted language
in Jordanwhich placed the court in the role of balancing the public interest against government

effectiveness. Id.
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of Jordan which adopted the literal meaning of "solely" and completely disregarded its own precedent.8 0 The dissent condemned the
majority opinion's acceptance of the Second and Ninth Circuits' decisions for two reasons. First, the majority failed to provide any reason
for adopting these decisions, and secondly, the weight of federal
authority directly contradicted this interpretation of exemption two's
language. 8 ' Not only did Judge Wilkey dispute the majority's disregard of Jordan'sholding, but he also claimed that the majority failed
to address the real issue of Jordan which Judge Wilkey perceived as
being the interpretation of the word "personnel" in exemption two. 82
While the majority in Crooker determined that "personnel" must be
widely construed to cover a variety of matters, the dissent alleged that
this interpretation was clearly disapproved by the Supreme Court in
Rose, which ruled that only trivial personnel matters were protected
by exemption two.8 3 Judge Wilkey pointed to the fact that when the
Supreme Court adopted the Vaughn majority opinion, it approved of
the distinction made between exempt minor or trivial matters and
nonexempt substantial matters as a guide for the courts.8 4 Therefore,
according to the dissent, the majority's reliance on Judge Leventhal's
concurring opinion in Vaughn, which substituted "predominantly"
for "solely," clearly clashed with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rose. 85 Furthermore, the dissent claimed that the stricter construction of "personnel" by the Court in Rose led the Jordancourt to reject
the standard of "predominantly internal" urged by Judge Leventhal,
and led the Court to instead adopt the Vaughn majority standard of
minor versus substantial matters. 8 In sum, the dissent charged that
the majority had simply ignored the analysis of exemption two con87
tained in Jordan and substituted a novel construction.

80 670 F.2d at 1094 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).

01 Id.
11 Id. at 1094-95 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).
h3 Id. at 1095 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
" Id. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 365 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d at 1142). See also supra
text accompanying note 41.
3s 670 F.2d at 1095. Judge Wilkey also pointed out that while the majority accepted Judge
Leventhal's definition of "predominant internality" over the literal meaning of "solely," it
rejected the essence of Judge Leventhal's standard: that exemption two is applicable " 'where
there is no substantial valid external interest of the community at large in revelation.' " Id.
(Wilkey, J.,dissenting)(quoting id. at 1057).
" Id. There is one other interpretation given to the term "personnel." Judge MacKinnon,
concurring in Crooker, relied on his statement in Jordan and Ginsburg that "personnel" only
modifies the word "rules" and not "practices." Id. at 1078 (MacKinnon, J.,concurring). See
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
81 670 F.2d at 1096 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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The majority in Crooker chose to rely on the House Report's more
expansive explanation of exemption two. Although the court briefly
considered the Senate Report, it concluded that the Senate provided
"little enlightenment as to Congress' intent concerning [E]xemption
[two]." 88 The description contained in the Senate Report was perceived by the majority as giving only some of the personnel rules
which should not be disclosed. 8 9 The majority largely ignored the
Senate Report but made several references to "cross-currents" of concern contained in the report's language.9 0 These "cross-currents"
were implied from comments of Senators expressing concern that the
government might be hampered by full disclosure. 9 1 These alleged
inadequacies of the Senate Report provided the impetus for the majority's reliance on the House Report, which Judge Edwards claimed
92
contained a wealth of information on congressional intent.
Several bills dealing with the FOIA were introduced into the
House. The majority relied in part on H.R. Rep. No. 501203 which
contained language identical to the language of exemption two in the
Senate bill later enacted as law. The court also referred to a comment
made by Congressman Moss, the principal sponsor of the bill, who
had stated that exemption two was intended to cover "manuals of
procedure." 94 The majority also relied on the House Report of S.
1160,95 later enacted as the FOIA.9 6 In conclusion, the majority
asserted that these indications of the House's concern, coupled with
the significant fact that these statements were not challenged and the
bill was passed, showed that the two reports were not contradictory
97
but merely covered different areas of concern.
" Id. at 1058. The majority based its conclusion on the lack of any comments or objections
by the Senate to witnesses' statements on the scope of exemption two contained in the record.
s1Id. See supra note 31. Specifically, the majority stated that these "examples" contained in
the Senate Report did not limit the scope of exemption two to minor employment matters.
Therefore, material in the House Report which granted a wider scope to exemption two was not
contradictory; the Senate was merely silent on the issue of risk of circumvention of the law. 670
F.2d at 1061. Thus, in reality, the majority determined that the House and Senate Reports may
be reconciled. Id. at 1065. See infra note 98. Judge MacKinnon concurred in the majority's
interpretation of the Senate Report. 670 F.2d at 1078 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
0 670 F.2d at 1058, 1061, 1063.
91 The section of the Senate Report relied on by the majority, however, was construed in the
context of examining the general purpose of the Act, not in a specific discussion of exemption
two.
92670 F.2d at 1061.
9389th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
94 Id. at 1059. The full text of Congressman Moss's statement is reprinted in Crooker. Id. at
1059 n.24.
9589th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
go Id. at 1060. See HOUSE REPOnT, supra note 32.
97 670 F.2d at 1059-61, 1065.
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In direct response to these allegations, the dissent countered that
the House and Senate Reports were irreconcilable and that the Senate
Report's description was exclusive. 8 Judge Wilkey took further exception to the majority's reliance on the House Report. °9 The dissent
discredited the remarks made by Congressman Moss, in reference to
H.R. 5012, by accusing the majority of taking them out of context. 00
Judge Wilkey then went on to introduce testimony given by other
witnesses in the House hearing to support his claim that exemption
two was never intended to protect law enforcement manuals. '0 ' Testi02
mony from the Senate hearings to the same effect was also quoted.1
The dissent also repudiated the majority's reliance on the House
Report of S. 1160.103 Judge Wilkey accused the House Committee
members of indulging in "last minute chicanery" when they inserted
the provisions on law enforcement manuals in the House Report to
avoid amending the bill.104 As Judge Wilkey pointed out, the House
Report on S. 1160 "was prepared only after the Senate had unanimously adopted the FOIA."105 Thus, as a result of the House passing
the Senate bill without amendment, the Senate was denied an opportunity to consider the House Report, in which members of the House
Committee had inserted their choices as to the scope of exemption
two.'0 8 Therefore, there was only one report before both Houses of

OSId. at 1097 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge MacKinnon responded to this claim of the
dissent by alleging that Judge Wilkey misread the statement in the Senate Report. In actuality,
Judge MacKinnon pointed out that the report states: "Exemption No. 2 relates only to the
internal personnel rules and practices of any agency. Examples of these may be rules as to
personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick
leave, and the like." Id. at 1083 (MacKinnon, J., concurring)(emphasis added). The dissent
completely disagreed with the majority that the House and Senate Reports may be reconciled.
judge Wilkey pointed to the general consensus that these reports are totally incompatible. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
The dissent was disturbed by what it termed a total "repudiation" of the Senate Report by
the majority, and referred to the Supreme Court reliance on the Senate Report in Rose. 670 F.2d
at 1098 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See supra note 54.
100 670 F.2d at 1101 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
301 Id. at 1102-03 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
102Id. at 1103 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
1o Id. at 1104-05 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
104 670 F.2d at 1099 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). judge Wilkey made the same claim against the
House in his opinion in Jordan, 591 F.2d at 768. judge Mikva took offense at these allegations.
He claimed that Judge Wilkey attributed to Congress an "obstinate irrationality" since it is clear
that Congress would not reasonably require disclosure of information which would impede law
enforcement. In response to the claim of chicanery, Judge Mikva found in this "a lamentable
tendency to scorn the legislative process." 670 F.2d at 1087 (Mikva, J., concurring).
10s 670 F.2d at 1098 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
,06 Id. Judge MacKinnon responded that: "[t]here was no "chicanery'" since the House Report, which issued after the Senate had passed the bill, indicated the same intent with respect to
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Congress, namely the Senate's, which provided the true indication of
congressional intent. 107
Judge Wilkey considered the majority's reliance on statements
made by certain representatives in the House debates an attempt to
characterize them as expressions of the entire House "when actually
the majority of persons who spoke on the subject before the House

indicated their belief that Exemption 2 did not cover law enforcement
manuals." 0 8
The majority justified its position by emphasizing that the court's
role was not "to apply individual provisions of the statute woodenly,"' 109 but to "interpret the law as we believe Congress meant it to
be read.""n0 Judge Wilkey responded that the court's role was not to
amend legislation, but merely to enforce the law as Congress wrote
it."'
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE

FOIA

The majority provided additional support for its interpretation of

personnel rules and agency practices of exemption two by examining
two other provisions of the FOIA, section 552(a)(2)(C) and section
552(b) (7) (E) (exemption seven),112 which protect investigatory material such as FBI records from disclosure. Relying on the maxim that a
statute must be read as a whole to understand its true meaning," 3 the
court stated that these two provisions "reinforce the conclusion that
Congress was aware of the need to protect investigative techniques
from disclosure.""14 Referring to the addition of the word "administrative" to modify staff manuals in section 552(a)(2)(C)," 5 the court
concluded that this evidenced the congressional "cross-currents" of
Exemption two as Congressman Moss had stated publicly at the very first hearing which
antedated the Senate hearings and the Senate Report." Id. at 1084 (MacKinnon, J.,concurring).
107 This viewpoint was enunciated in Vaughn and adopted by the Supreme Court in Rose, but
with a qualification. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
108 670 F.2d at 1105 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting)(emphasis in original).
109 Id. at 1065.
110 Id. at 1066. Judge Mikva also emphasized this role in his concurring opinion. Specifically,
he stated that the court must "interpret the results of the legislation process as reasonable and not
ridiculous." Id. at 1088 (Mikva, J.,concurring).
"I Id. at 1121 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting). In his concurring opinion Judge Mikva spoke at some
length on the topic of judicial versus legislative roles. In his view, the courts have a duty to
society to interpret the law reasonably. Id. at 1089 (Mikva, J.,concurring).
112For the text of section 552(a)(2)(C), see supra note 13. Exemption seven provides:
"(b)
This section does not apply to matters that are-(7) investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would... (E)
disclose investigative techniques and procedures." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C)(1976).
13 670 F.2d at 1062. (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)).
114 Id.
11"

See supra text accompanying notes 58 & 59.
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concern over the impact of full disclosure on government effectiveness. 116 As for exemption seven, which was amended in 1974 to limit
the scope of the release of investigative techniques and procedures, the
majority relied on the Senate debate to7 clarify the original intent of
Congress when considering the FOIA.1
Judge Wilkey claimed in his dissent that the reliance placed by
the majority on these sections was misplaced. While the majority
explicitly affirmed the ruling in Jordan that section 552(a) (2)(C) does
not protect law enforcement manuals, the court argued that this
section provided insight into exemption two." 8 The dissent claimed
that this reliance on the addition of the word "administrative" in
section 552(a)(2)(C) showed how easily Congress could have changed
the wording of exemption two if it had chosen to do so." 9 The dissent
further dismissed the majority's reliance on exemption seven by arguing that the 1974 amendments to exemption seven and the ensuing
debate cited by the majority were actually a response by Congress "to
amend ... in favor of more disclosure.12 0 Furthermore, the use of
the term "investigative techniques" in exemption seven implies that
exemption two was not intended to cover law enforcement manuals
since this would make the enactment of exemption seven redundant.' 2 1
Another point significant to the dissent's argument was the enactment by Congress of The Government in the Sunshine Act. 2 2 This
Act contained an exemption identical to the language of exemption
two in the FOIA. 2 3 The dissent pointed out that the House Report
on the Sunshine Act reiterated the narrow interpretation given to
exemption two by the Senate in the FOIA.124 Unfortunately, the
majority addressed this issue only peripherally: "We note that we do
t16670 F.2d at 1063.
117Id. at 1065.
ID

670 F.2d at 1105 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).

I'DId.

,20Id. at 1110 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).
I2'Id.

"

5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
670 F.2d at 1107-08 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).
Id. Specifically the House Report states:
(2) This exemption includes meetings relating solely to an agency's internal personnel rules and practices. it is intended to protect the privacy of staff members and to
cover the handling of strictly internal matters. It does not include discussions or
information dealing with agency policies governing employees' dealings with the
public, such as manuals or directives setting forth job functions or procedures. As is

the case with all of the exemptions, a closing or withholding permitted by this
paragraph shQuld not be made if the public interest requires otherwise.
H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
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not find it particularly significant that Congress enacted in 1976 a
provision in the Government in the Sunshine Act identically worded
Yet, the dissent observed that the
to Exemption 2 of FOIA."''2
Senate Report to the Sunshine Act explicitly noted the relationship: "This wording parallels the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(b) (2). 126 The dissent argued that the existence of four Committee
Reports on the same statutory language, with the two Senate Reports
and the 1976 House Report in agreement, indicated that the House in
1976 had retreated from its position on the FOIA in 1966, and now
recognized that exemption two did not apply to law enforcement
27

manuals. '

CASE LAW

Inevitably the court turned to precedent to further establish its
claim. Although the court referred to various cases, it relied primarily
on Rose, Vaughn and Jordan. As the majority noted, the Supreme
Court's decision in Rose did not address the issue of the scope of
exemption two presented in Crooker.2 8 The majority opinion, however, emphasized the implication in Rose that where circumvention of
the law is a possibility, exemption two as defined in the House Report
may be invoked to prevent disclosure. 2 9 Next, the Crooker decision
focused on the predominantly internal standard of Judge Leventhal in
Vaughn because he had taken notice of the "cross-currents" of congressional concern.130 Finally, the majority considered its recent decision in Jordan. In an attempt to lessen the impact of Jordan that
exemption two does not apply to law enforcement manuals, the court
31
discredited the supposed "majority" which had upheld Jordan.1
Judge Edwards noted that Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion had
125 670 F.2d at 1062 n.30. Judge MacKinnon noted that the House Report on the Sunshine Act
appears to define two categories: (1) strictly internal matters, and (2) directions of job functions. He claimed that this division reflected the same point as Judge Leventhal's interpretation
of "predominant internality" in Jordan by stating its intent "to cover the handling of strictly
internalmatters." Id. at 1080 (MacKinnon, J., concurring)(emphasis in original).
126 Id. at 1109 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)(citing S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975)).
127 Id. (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
118 The majority briefly considered the decisions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits which relied
on section 552(a)(2)(C) to prevent disclosure. Although rejecting the rationale of these cases that
exemption two does not protect law enforcement manuals, id. at 1070-71, the court cited them as
indicative of Congress' intent to prevent disclosure of law enforcement manuals. Id. at 1071. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
The court also surveyed the Second and Ninth Circuits' decisions withholding BATF manuals based on exemption two. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
19 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
130 670 F.2d at 1066.
131Id. at 1067.
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emphasized the secret law aspect of the prosecutorial guidelines,' 32
while Judge Leventhal and Chief Judge Robinson had relied on the
concept of "predominantly internal."' 3 3 Thus, out of a five judge
majority only two judges actually agreed with both the result and the
rationale of Jordan.
The dissent did not refute these claims at great length. Judge
Wilkey's discussion of Rose concentrated on the Supreme Court's
adoption and endorsement of the majority opinion in Vaughn, choosing the literal meaning of the term "solely."'134 In response to the
implication in Rose that the House Report may be relied on where
circumvention of the law is a possibility, the dissent answered that
"the Supreme Court quite clearly intended to avoid altogether the
issue of which report should control in a case of circumvention of
agency regulations." 135 The dissent further stated that the decisions
in both Vaughn and Jordan had determined that the Senate Report
was more indicative of congressional intent. 36
ANALYSIS

Based on its analysis of the language of the Act, legislative history, and case law, the court devised a new test to deal with exemption two cases. It relied on the standard of predominant internality
formulated by Judge Leventhal in Vaughn and emphasized the necessity of preventing possfble circumvention of the law.137 This two
prong test framed by the majority was an attempt to find a solution to
a complex and confusing area of litigation. 38 The court's decision
was too result-oriented; clearly, the majority interpretated the law to
reach a decision which it viewed as desirable, regardless of the language or history of the statute involved. This approach may be valid
in an area of law that is not governed by statute, but in this case the
scope of exemption two is restricted by congressional mandate. Disclosure is the key aspect of the FOIA, and however legitimate the court's
interest is in protecting government effectiveness, the judiciary's primary concern must be to enforce the laws as Congress has seen fit to
enact them.
112 Id. at

39

1068.

Id. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
"'
670 F.2d at 1111 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
135 Id.
136Id. at 1111-12 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
137Id. at 1074. See supra text accompanying notes 4447.
138670 F.2d at 1114 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). There is at present an effort in Congress to revise
the FOTA, including exemption two, to solve these problems. Id. at 1119 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
" The role of the judiciary was one of the disputed points between the dissent and judge
Mikva's concurring opinion. Judge Wilkey regarded the duty of a judge as objectively interpret"'
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This result-oriented approach of the court was most apparent
from the majority's treatment of the Jordan case. The decision in

Jordan was completely opposite to that of Crooker, despite remarkably similar facts. Thus, the court's assertion that the result in Jordan
would remain unchanged is extremely perplexing. The majority

claimed that the material in Jordanwas not "predominantly internal"
in nature but was really "secret law" as Judge Bazelon had
claimed.140 The majority distinguished the guidelines in Jordan from
the BATF manual in Crooker by defining the guidelines as "instructions to agency personnel . .. on how to regulate members of the

public." ' 4' In contrast, the court claimed that the BATF manual was

not "concerned with regulating the behavior of the public, but consist[ed] solely of instructions to agency personnel." 42 Thus, the material in Jordan had to be released, whereas the manual in Crooker did
not. Secondly, the majority reasoned that there were no facts in
Jordanwhich indicated that the material could be used to circumvent
the law, while in Crooker there was sufficient indication of possible
circumvention. 43 According to this rationale the result in Jordan
under the new test would be unchanged.
Judge Ginsberg's concurring opinion in Crooker directly rebutted
the majority's assertion. To claim that the result in Jordan would be
the same under the new test the court had to determine that either (1)
the Jordan guidelines were not used for predominantly internal purposes, or (2) circumvention of the law was not a significant possibility.

44

The majority could not reach a decision on the second factor

because the Jordan court had not determined whether a risk of circumvention existed. Accordingly, the Crooker court had to conclude
ing and enforcing the law. Id. at 1121 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Mikva took the view that if
the results of a strict application of a statute would be absurd then some "latitude of construction" must be used. Id. at 1089 (Mikva, J., concurring). See supra note 110.
110 670 F.2d at 1075. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. The court's emphasis on the
secret law aspect of Jordanwas echoed by Judge MacKinnon who found it "clear that decisive
votes in Jordan really turned on the secret law and predominant internality aspects of the facts in
that case." 670 F.2d at 1077 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Judge Wilkey viewed the sudden
acceptance of a single concurring judge's opinion as ridiculous. The majority opinion in Jordan
contained no reference to secret law, nor did Judge MacKinnon's dissent in Jordan ever refer to
this concept. Id. at 1117-18 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
141670 F.2d at 1075.
£42 Id. The court's distinction seems dependent on the public interest test of Rose, yet the court
has specifically mandated that it is not the place of the court to determine what is and what is not
in the public interest. Id. at 1074. This standard of public interest was also the crux of Judge
Leventhal's test in Vaughn. As Judge Wilkey pointed out, the rejection of this portion of
Leventhal's test and the retention of only the "predominantly internal" portion rendered application of the test untenable. Id. at 1119 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1075. Crooker agreed that circumvention was a possibility.
'4
Id. at 1091 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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that the prosecutorial guidelines in Jordan were not predominantly
internal,1 45 and therefore could be released. This distinction between
the guidelines in Jordan-of non-internal concern-and the manual
in Crooker-of internal concern-was unclear and artificial. As Judge
Ginsberg observed, the guidelines in Jordan did not in reality tell the
public how to behave, rather they were intended to aid agency personnel in the performance of their jobs. 46 Where, then, is the distinction between the agent's instructions in Crooker and the personnel
guidelines in Jordan? It would seem that if the court's new test were
applied to Jordan's facts the result, as well as the rationale, would be
changed. Judge Wilkey claimed that the overturning of Jordanwould
lessen the credibility of the court since "if this court can switch its
interpretation of Exemption two so completely in three years, it
' 47
would not be difficult to switch back again in, say, ten years."'
Perhaps the court attempted to justify its result in Jordan so as to
disguise the true reason for the court's sudden abandonment of its
prior ruling. In reality, the court wished to achieve a specific result in
Crooker and did so, despite the cost to credibility, precedent, or
upholding of the law.
These flaws in the court's rationale are the result of inherent
problems in the test itself. The first standard, whether or not the
material is predominantly internal, includes no guidelines as to its
scope. For example, the court determined that the BATF manual in
Crooker did not embody instructions on how to regulate the public,
148 and were intended only
but merely on how to observe it,
for agency
personnel. Yet, as Judge Wilkey observed, the material in Crooker
detailed surveillance techniques to be used on the public. 4
The
importance of this distinction is that the court had to make a value
judgment on whether or not this information in the BATF manual
was of interest to the public; 10 the majority had firmly maintained
that it was not within the role of the judiciary to make such a determination.' 5 ' The application of this standard entails difficulties, such as
inconsistent decisions within the judicial system, since the determination whether or not the public has an interest in the information will
depend on each judge's discretion. 52

14s Id.
148 Id.

at 1091 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 1118 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
118Id. at 1075.
149Id. at 1115 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
150Id.
15'Id. at 1056 n.12.
IstId. at 1115 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). There is one additional problem that is raised by the
dissent. If the definition of predominantly internal means that the information was developed for
117
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Problems also exist with the second standard of the test-the
possibility of circumvention of the law. Before the exemption can be
applied both aspects of the test must be met. However, if something is
predominantly internal, how could it possibly be used to circumvent
the law? It would seem that logically these two standards are contradictory 15 3 and that the test is a failure. Because the test provides for
judicial discretion, however, it does allow the court to achieve whatever result it desires. From the majority's view this makes the test
successful.
Before condemning the majority's effort, however, it is important
to consider what alternatives are available. As previously outlined
there are basically two statutory provisions used by the courts to
exempt law enforcement manuals: section 552(a)(2)(C), and exemption two.l1 4

While the language and legislative history of section

552(a)(2)(C) provides some support for the conclusion that only administrative staff manuals and not law enforcement manuals must be
disclosed, there are several problems with this approach. 55 First the
"catchall" provision of section 552(a)(3) has not been adequately dealt
with even by the implicit exemption doctrine. 58 The second difficulty with section 552(a) (2) (C) is the Supreme Court's decision in EPA
v. Mink, which held that the only exemptions under the FOIA are
those enumerated in section 552(b).1

57

Therefore, the use of an "ex-

emption" found in subsection (a) directly conflicts with the Supreme
Court's ruling.
As with section 552(a)(2)(C), the use of exemption two as a
means of preventing disclosure is open to much debate. This is readily
apparent from the discussion in Crooker. The language and legislative
history as interpreted by the dissent did not indicate any intention on
the part of Congress to provide protection for law enforcement manuals. Indeed, for the majority to rely on exemption two it was necessary to adopt a new standard. If Congress had intended to endow
exemption two with such powers of protection it would clearly have
stated as much in the language of the Act. The fact that only two
circuits, aside from the D.C. Circuit, have chosen to rely on exempinternal use as the majority suggests, then every document prepared by an agency and used by its
employees to a certain extent will be exempt. Judge Wilkey argues that this will render the FOIA
virtually useless. Id. at 1115 n.109 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).

Judge Wilkey takes this claim even further and accuses the majority of being concerned
153
with only the second standard while the "predominant internality" standard is simply manipudissenting).
lated to support the desired result. Id. at 1115 (Wilkey, J.,
5'4See supra
155 See supra
158 See supra
1s7See supra

text accompanying notes 57-60.
notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text.
note 62 and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 5-7.
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tion two supports the proposition that there is no "law enforcement
manual" exemption.' 58
The nonstatutory alternative which seems to be the most viable is
the public interest test, first advocated by Judge Leventhal in his
concurring opinion in Vaughn. ,59 This concept of whether the public
has a legitimate interest in the material sought to be protected was
further developed by Judge Leventhal in Jordan, and incorporated by
the Supreme Court in Rose.' 60 Unfortunately, the court in Crooker
repudiated the public interest element of Judge Leventhal's argument.
Without this guideline the predominantly internal test cannot function since there is no standard built into the test.
In issues such as this the court is obligated to balance the competing interests of the public's right to know certain information and the
effective functioning of government. The court in Crooker must
choose between the two: either it must accept the fact that exemption
two does not provide protection, as is strongly demonstrated by the
dissent, or it must accept the use of judicial discretion in balancing
competing interests. The court's attempt to employ a "half way" test
further evidences the fact that the court was merely concerned with
reaching a result, rather than a viable, clear solution to this issue.
The court's reluctance to adopt this public interest test expressly
is understandable, as it would undeniably set up an explosive situation
between the judiciary and the legislature.' 6 ' A judge would still have
no set standard or guide to follow and no way to be certain of not
overstepping the boundaries of his role. The difficulties of these alternatives show that the issue in Crooker is unable to be resolved by the
court. However, the problem could easily be resolved by congressional
amendment to exemption two providing for the protection of law
enforcement materials. It is the role of the legislature to write the
laws, not the role of the court to write into the laws.
Laura Anne Chip
I" Judge Wilkey also cites this fact as further evidence of the result orientated approach of the
majority. 670 F.2d at 1112-13 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
I" See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
'0 See supra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
181 Both Judge Mikva and Judge Wilkey expressed an awareness of these conflicting roles. 670
F.2d at 1090 (Mikva, J., concurring); id. at 1121 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See supra notes 110 &
136.

